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ABSTRACT 
An extensive literature in labor economics recognizes that the life-cycle labor force 
participation of a woman is highly associated with her family choices. There is, 
however, virtually no study going further to incorporate female occupational choices. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap in labor supply literature by examining the 
interrelatedness of occupation, marital status and fertility choices of women over the 
life cycle. A discrete choice dynamic utility maximization model is constructed to 
investigate how relevant determinants influence a woman’s career and family path and 
how these decisions interplay with each other. Using longitudinal data on women from 
the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I estimate my 
model through the maximum likelihood estimation method in a dynamic programming 
fashion which takes into account the uncertainties from random arrivals of job 
opportunities, unexpected failure of birth control and temporary shocks to family 
earnings. The estimation results of structural parameters indicate that women’s life-
cycle patterns of occupation, marriage and contraceptive behaviors vary significantly 
with their observable characteristics such as age, education, ability, race, and the 
presence of young children.  
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1.  Introduction 
__________________________ 
In recent decades, there has been an increased recognition among labor 
economists in the study of female labor supply that a woman’s labor force participation 
is highly associated with her family choices like marriage status and fertility decisions. 
Along with this growing awareness, an expanding literature has been devoted to jointly 
modeling women’s labor supply and family choices. A plethora of studies, for example, 
examine the interdependence between marital status and labor force participation 
choices (e.g. McElroy (1985), Johnson and Skinner (1986, 1988), and Van Der Klaauw 
(1996)), and many others focus on female labor supply and childbearing choices or both 
marriage and fertility decisions (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), Hotz and Miller 
(1988), Blackburn, Bloom and Neumark (1993), Francesconi (2002), Ueda (2007)). 
Some recent studies further consider schooling as a choice variable along with women’s 
labor force participation, marriage status and fertility decisions (e.g. Gustafsson and 
Worku (2005), Goldin (2006), Sheran (2007)). The existing studies, however, virtually 
never explicitly incorporate female occupational choices and model occupational 
choice, marriage and fertility decisions jointly.  
        It  has  been  well  documented  that female occupational choices are strongly 
correlated with their family choices. According to Budig and England (2001), for 
example, a woman with children may temporarily interrupt full-time employment or 
voluntarily trade off higher wages for “mother-friendly” jobs. This is in line with the 
crux of Becker’s (1985) work-effort hypothesis that married women economize on the 
effort expended on labor market work by seeking less energy-demanding occupations. 
Several recent studies show that a sizeable minority of professional women prevent the 
conflicts of dual family and professional roles by remaining single, while many others 
choose to be childless or postpone childbirth (e.g. Hewlett (2002)).  
In addition, demographic trends exhibit a sharply rising share of female 
professionals in the United States labor force over the past decades. Professional and 
related occupations are expected to be the most rapidly growing occupational category 
of women in the U.S..
 1 In 1970, 16.6 percent of the managerial and administrative jobs 
went to women, and by 2000, women in the closest comparable group (management, 
business, and financial operations) represented 41.9 percent of the group.
 2 The 
proportion of employed women working in professional and related specialties 
                                                 
1 See Professional Women: Vital Statistics by Department of Professional Employees (2006). 
2 See the U.S. Census 2000 Special Reports (2005).   3
increases from 21.9 percent in 1983 to 33.7 percent in 2002,
 3 which are expected to 
increase by more than 21.2 percent over the next ten years.
 4 
Therefore, jointly modeling occupation and family choices becomes crucial to a 
better understanding of the interdependence of the contemporary women’s career and 
family choices. Accordingly, the interdependence of sequential choice decisions has 
important policy implications in order to reduce work-family conflict for mothers in 
different occupations. Ignoring the occupational choice inherent in the labor force 
participation decision could result in inaccurate forecasts of policy changes, mislead our 
research, and thus fail to capture the inherent dynamic nature of the interaction of 
female labor supply, marital status, and fertility decisions.  
This paper attempts to fill this gap in the labor supply literature by presenting a 
structural dynamic model that explicitly addresses the interdependence among labor 
force participation choices, marriage and fertility decisions. In the model, a female 
maximizes the expected discounted value of her utility each period over her life cycle 
by simultaneously determining what category of occupation to enter,
 5 whether to be 
married, and whether to use contraception. These decisions depend on her previous 
career and family choices and have impact on future relevant choices. Correspondingly, 
individuals derive utility from being married, the presence of children, and the 
consumption of a composite good as well as the contribution of occupation choices 
through wage earnings. By setting the sequential choice decisions interdependent, the 
structural model enables us to examine the joint determination of labor supply, 
occupation and family choices of women and the dependence of these decisions on the 
presence of children and other individual characteristics, such as age, race, ability, et 
cetera. More realistically, the model incorporates various uncertainties, such as those 
associated with job search opportunities, imperfection of birth controls, and random 
shocks to current and future wage earnings. 
Using longitudinal data on young women from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY), the maximum likelihood estimation along with a convenient 
dynamic programming method is employed to obtain structural estimates of the model. 
The estimated structural model appears to be a reasonably good fit to the data. Some 
findings are noteworthy. Relative to nonprofessional women, for example, the presence 
of children (especially young children) reduces a female professional’s utility flows 
more dramatically. I also find that the higher AFQT score increases a female’s utility 
                                                 
3 Source: Current Population Survey, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
4 See Professional Women: Vital Statistics by Department of Professional Employees (2006). 
5  Occupation is divided broadly and roughly into three subcategories: professional and managerial, 
nonprofessional, and housework. Detailed categorization is based on 1977 Standard Occupation 
Classification System. Choosing the first two means working in the labor force while the latter means 
staying at home.   4
flows in dramatic magnitude if she works in a professional occupation. On the contrary, 
all else equal, the higher AFQT score makes a nonprofessional female’s utility flow 
decreases. Job search cost from other occupations to professionals is about 2.5 times 
higher than that for the mobility from other occupations to nonprofessional. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic 
structural model for female labor force participation, marital status and fertility pattern 
decisions. Section 3 describes the dynamic programming method to solve the 
maximization of women’s life-cycle expected discounted value of utility. Section 4 
discusses the data. Section 5 deals with the econometric specification and estimation of 




2. Economic Structure Model 
__________________________ 
          I consider a structural dynamic model in which I focus primarily on a female’s 
decision process for her occupation, marriage, and fertility while ideally assuming that 
all (potential) husbands always work full time in the labor market.
 6 In so doing, I shun 
away the notoriously complicated multivariate choice problem, and leave the direct 
contribution of marriage to utility to be characterized solely as some portion of the 
husband’s wage income, share of child-raising expenditure and birth control cost. 
Utility gains or losses are directly associated with the current combined choice of labor 
force participation, marital and fertility status as well as the duration of corresponding 
states. Uncertainties are further taken into account in recognition of the random arrival 
of job opportunities, temporary shocks to female and male earnings and imperfect 
control women have over births. 
            A woman is assumed to maximize the present value of life-cycle utility in each 
period over a known finite horizon, T , by choosing which occupation to enter, whether 
to be married, and whether to use contraception, and how much to consume.  
             Let  (, ,)
M LH
tt t t p pp p = denote the occupation choice variable at time t, 
where 1
M
t p =  if a woman chooses to work at managerial and professional specialty 
occupations and zero otherwise,  1
H
t p =  if a woman chooses to do home production 
                                                 
6  Sheron (2007) presents a similar framework which considers women’s education choice along with 
their career and family decisions.    5
and zero otherwise,
 7  1
L
t p =   if a woman chooses to work at other nonprofessional 
occupations and zero otherwise.  
             Let  1 t m =  if she chooses to be married at time t given that a marriage offer is 
available and zero otherwise. Let  1 t b = if she doesn’t want to get pregnant and uses 
birth control at time t and zero otherwise. Let  t c  denote the consumption at time t.  In 
this vein, a woman chooses a path {( , , ) ; } tt t tt pmb I c
+ ∈ ∈ℜ  for  1,2,..., tT = , where 
t I  represents the set of choice possibilities for t p ,   t m , and  t b  in period t. Note that 
there are three choices of occupation, two for marriage status, two for birth control, and 
thus totally 12 mutually exclusive choices available each period.  
          The presence of children has great impact on a woman’s utility gain and loss, 
whilst the ages and number of children have additionally been suggested to be of 
different effects on her choices. Along with this line, I categorize the children ever born 
to a woman into two groups in terms of children’s number and ages, in order to obtain a 
clearer picture of the fertility pattern and its effects.
8 Let  1 t n = if a woman gives birth 
in period t and zero otherwise. Let 
1
t
t Nn τ τ= =∑  
0,5 6,18
1 tt t t Nn NN − =+ =+ denotes the 
total number of children a woman has up to time t,
 9 where 
0,5
t N represents the number 
of children ever born, as of time t, who are under the age of 6, and 
6,18
t N represents the 
number of children ever born, as of time t, who are between the age of 6 and 18.
 10 
         Utility  also  depends  on  the  previous period’s work experience and family 
decisions as well as several other individual characteristics. The disutility of working, 
for example, may increase over time due to accumulated stress from some particular 
workload pressure, but meanwhile, it may bring positive effects such as habit formation 
or complementarity of leisure time in subsequent periods. Observable individual 
characteristics vector t Z , such as education, age, race, ability, and religion, capture the 
heterogeneity of tastes across different individuals. Let  (,,,) '
MLH
tt t t t DL L L M =  denote 
the duration vector, where
M
t L is the accumulated labor market experience with 
managerial or related profession at time t, 
L
t L   accumulated experience in laborer 
markets at time t, 
H
t L  accumulated experience in housework at time t, and  t M refers to 
                                                 
7  I treat housework as a classification of occupation. 
8  I only consider children ages 18 years old or younger.  
9  I do not consider the case of multi-birth in a single delivery, which, according to the survey, is very 
rare, if any.  
10 For simplicity, this paper abstracts from the mortality of children. Also see Wolpin (1984).   6
the duration of the current marriage at time t. The relation between the duration 
























                                                      (1) 
          With the choice variables and state variables described above, the objective of a 
woman at any timet , 1,2,..., tT = , is to maximize the expected present value of her 
future utility stream 
1
11 1 1 {[ ( , , , ; , , , , ) ] }
T t
tt t tt t tt t t EU p m c b p m N D Z β
−
−− − = ∑                  (2) 
where β represents the individual’s subjective discount factor that is typically presumed 
to be in the (0,1) interval and E is the expectation operator. 
           The period utility function is further specified as 
11 1
11 1
(,,, , , ,, ,)
        ( , , , , , , , ) ( , , )
tt tt t t tt t
t t t t tt t t t t tt
Upmcp m NbD Z
Qpm p m NbD Z c pmb ε
−− −
−− − =+ +
     (3) 
where  () Q ⋅  is the utility function which describes the utility flow from both current and 
past choices, family structure and their interdependence, and is assumed to be 
independent of consumption.  (,,) tt t p mb ε captures preference shock to utility 
associated with each choice, which are assumed to be independent across time, choices 
and individuals.
11   
         The first term of the utility function is specified as 
           11 1 (,, , , ,, ,) ttt t t tt t Qpm p m NbD Z −− −  
           12 3 4
ML
tt tt bm b p b p bb =+ + +  




tt tt tt t t BZm BZp BZp BZb ++ + +                                                (4) 




t t tt tt t t A Nm ANp ANp AN b ++ + + 
                51 6 1 71 8 1 +( 1 )  + ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
M ML L
tt t t t t t t bm mb mm b p p b p p −− − − −− + − + −  
                91 1 01 1 1 1 + 
M ML L
tt t t t t bmM b p L b p L −− − ++  
 
                                                 
11 Also see Rust (1987) and Berkovec and Stern(1991). In this paper, I don’t allow for the time 
dependence in the error structure, which could be incorporated in the future estimation.   7
where  t N  is a vector, i.e.
0,5 6,18 ' ( ) tt t NN N = . Note that  1 b through  4 b captures the direct 
effects of a woman’s choices over marriage, occupation and fertility,  1 B  through  4 B  
reflects the choice-specific effects of individual characteristics like education, age, race, 
ability, and religion,  1 A  through  4 A  is the choice-specific effect of having children,  5 b  
through  8 b   is the instant gains (losses) from the current choice deviating from the 
previous period, while   9 b  through  11 b  captures the effects of the previous period’s 
work experience and marital status decision.
12  
            Assume that the nature of capital markets are perfectly-imperfect (PICM), i.e. 
there is no borrowing or savings across time periods, and consumption is separable,
13 
the choice decision for consumption of the second component of the period utility 
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where  { } , ,  M LH Θ=   denote the set of choices for occupation.ψ represents the 
proportion of pooled net family income.
 14 
M
t w and 
L
t w are different wage earnings for a 
working female corresponding to her occupation choice, 
h
t w denotes her husband’s 
wage earnings if she chooses to be married ( 1 t m = ).ϕ  represents the contraception cost.  
The parameter  1 μ is a multiplier that converts number of children ages under 6 into 
expenditure in terms of a monetary equivalent consumption value.  (.) I  is an indicator 
function equal to unity when the argument is true.  t WP  Represents the period t welfare 
payment a woman receives from the government if she is single but has at least one 
child under the age of 18.  
                                                 
12 Another noteworthy aspect is the interdependence between current decision of marriage and 
occupation, which may also have impact on the utility flow from children, duration variables, and 
individual characteristics. Including the interactive term would allow us to examine the issue in more 
depth and may provide further insight into the interdependence of a woman’s occupation, marriage, and 
fertility decision. On the other hand, it may lead to “the curse of dimension” easily due to the 
computational infeasibility. Hence, I do not include the interaction term for the sake of simplicity of 
estimation. 
13 See Hotz and Willis (1997). 
14 I arbitrary set ψ =0.5 in the part to obviate the complicated estimation due to data limitation.    8
              The  right-hand  side  of  the  budget  constraint  refers  to  share  of  a  woman’s 
earning and her husband’s earning less the portion of expenditures on children and birth 
control. The first part in the right-hand side of equation (5) describes the case of a 
married woman while the second part represents the case of a single woman. In 
addition, a woman’s wage earnings are occupation-specific, but as aforementioned, I let 
her husband’s wage to be determined by his individual characteristic per se, regardless 
the female’s choice.  
           The female’s own current and future wage earnings are stochastically and will 
generally depend on the female’s previous work decisions. Accordingly, when the 
female chooses to work, her wage depends on her personal characteristics  t Z , features 
of her local labor market  t F , and her previous period’s work decision, her total work 
experience, and a random shock to her earnings. Thus 
12 3 1 4 1
2
51 61 7 1
 ln( ) ( )' ( )'
         ( )
M MM M M M M L
tt t t t
MM ML M M
tt t t
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t F refer to the professional and nonprofessional local labor market 
features, respectively. Note that the previous period’s work decision,  1 t p −  is included 
separately other than the duration variable 1 t L − , allows for a stronger effect of more 
recent work experience. The shocks to her wage earnings are assumed to be i.i.d. over 
time.  
            The earnings of each female’s (potential) husband in period t are specified as 
2
12 3 1 4 1  ln( ) ( )' ( )' ( )
hh h h h h h h h h
tt t t t t wZ F L L v δδ δ δ −− =++ + +                             (8) 
where 
h
t Z is a vector capturing her (potential) husband’s personal characteristics, such 
as education, age, race, religion, etc and the superscript h denotes husband. 
h
t F a vector 
capturing her (potential) husband’s local labor market features.  1
h
t L −  refers  to  her 
husband’s work experience. 
h
t v  is assumed as i.i.d. random shocks to her (potential) 
husband’s wage earnings over time.  
            A woman may give birth as planned, but in some cases childbearing could be 
unexpected. Thus uncertainty in utility arises when birth control fails. In this regard, 
although the relation between fertility and birth control is quite straightforward, simply 
modeling  t n and  t b to be linear would be apparently unrealistic and fail to capture the   9
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=Φ + + + + +
++ +
                            (9) 
where  () Φ⋅is the standard normal distribution function,  1 t g − is the age of a woman at 
time t-1, and  2
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( 1 , , , , , , , ,  )'
h
tt t t t t t t t X ggbNmpww −− − − − − − − =  is the information set at 
time  1 t − . 
            Uncertainty also arises with respect to job offers. Realistically, a woman may 
always be able to choose to stay at home for some period, while job offer opportunities 
may not be available in that period when she decides to go out for work. In recognition 
of this, I allow for the possibility that choice set  t I  in each period may not include all 
occupational status options, i.e. the option to get employed in professional or 
nonprofessional occupations may not materialize in each period when currently 
unemployed. In addition, I permit the probability of such an event to differ for different 
individuals, by characterizing the arrival of a job offer opportunity in each period by 
that arrival rate, 1 (, ) tt p Z − ϒ , which depends on the occupational choice in last period, 
vector of individual characteristics and the unemployment rate of local labor market, 
t Z . Let J denote the subset of  t I   only related to occupation choice. I have the 
following cases: 
 
1)  if both categories of job offer opportunity exist,  
{ } { } { } { } 1 0,1 ,   0,1 ,   0,1
MLH
tt t Jp p p =∈ ∈ ∈  
2) if only managerial job offer opportunity exists, 
           { } { } { } 2 0,1 ,   0,   0,1
ML H
tt t Jp p p =∈ = ∈                           (10) 
3) if only laborer job offer opportunity exists, 
{ } { } { } 3 0,   0,1 ,   0,1
ML H
tt t Jp p p == ∈ ∈  
 4) neither of job offer opportunity exists, 
          { } 4 0,   0,   1
MLH
tt t Jp p p == = =                                10
                I further assume that if a woman has been in the labor force, then job offer 
opportunity for the category occupation of her current job will always exist. And also if 
she works in managerial profession, she will always have the option to choose to work 
in laborer profession. Thus, for example, the arrival rate given a woman does not work 
in the previous period, 1 (, ) tt p Z − ϒ , is specified as 
1 Pr( | 1) ((0,0,1),  ) ( ' )   for  1,2,3
H








J pZ Z π −
=
== ϒ = − Φ ∑               
          The similar concern would be raised about marital search. One may claim that, 
like job offer opportunity, a single woman may not find a potential husband in some 
periods although she would like to be married at these episodes. Undoubtedly, 
incorporating the uncertainty associated with marital search would upgrade the 
completeness of model setting. The computational cost, however, is also 
overwhelmingly high. Combining the incomplete choice sets due to marital search with 
job search, I may have4 2 8 ×=J ’s, and accordingly8 2 3 48 × ×= ϒ ’s, which thereby 
substantially increases the number of the parameters to be estimated. Given that, I may 
be left with no much option but sidestep this randomness. 
 
 
3. Data Description 
__________________________ 
       This study extracts data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). 
The NLSY started in 1979 with a sample of 12,686 youths ages 14-22 which includes a 
nationally representative of young people living in the United States in 1979 and a 
supplementary low-income and minority sample. The survey collects a wealth of 
longitudinal information as demographic and family background characteristics, labor 
market experience, educational attainment, occupational aspirations, marital history, 
child care, pre- and post-natal health behaviors, and religious affiliation.
 15 This paper 
utilizes a subsample of 622 out of 3,077 women aged between 18 and 21 in 1979 (or 
21-24 in 1982 and 35 to 38 in 1996) from 1982 through 1996.
16 This age group was 
                                                 
15 Sample members were interviewed annually from 1979 through 1994, and were interviewed on a 
biennial basis thereafter. 
16 Three independent probability samples comprise the NLSY79 data. The three samples are: (1) a cross-
sectional sample (6,111) designed to be representative of the noninstitutionalized civilian segment of 
young people living in the United States in 1979 and born 1957 through 1964 (2) a set of supplemental 
samples (5,295) designed to oversample civilian Hispanic, black, and economically disadvantaged, non-
Hispanic, non-black youth born in the same time period (3) a military sample (1,280). 173 were dropped   11
selected to better incorporate fertility behaviors over women’s fertile years. Moreover, 
we are in a better position to assume that education decisions have been completed by 
the first observation year.   
       I choose NLSY79 to take its many advantages that very well suit this analysis. In 
addition to the timing of marriage, divorce, and birth events, it provides valuable 
information on the contraception choices of women which was regularly collected 
annually from 1982 to 1986. After 1986 the questions were asked biennially.
 17 I use 
regression imputation method to impute those years that we can’t observe contraceptive 
usage.  The survey also collects detailed information on female’s labor market activities 
and transitions, including current labor force status (i.e., employed, unemployed, out of 
the labor force), job characteristics such as occupation, class of worker, rate of pay, and 
hours worked per week for the current or most recent job. 
         A woman is defined to work in professional, non-professional or home production 
specialty if her current job or most recent job belongs to professional, non-professional 
or home production category, respectively, on the basis of job characteristics regarding 
occupation description.
18 In computing the female’s and her (potential) husband’s wage 
earnings, I follow the treatment by Van Der Klaauw (1996), Swann(2005), and Sheran 
(2007), assuming all labor market work is full-time, and calculate the wage earnings as 
her/his hourly wage rate multiplies 2000 hours. A woman is defined to be married if she 
is married before the first of March.
 19 A woman is defined to be using birth control in a 
given year if she states that she is utilizing certain method of contraceptive throughout 
the year.   
          Other than these choice variables, I further define binary variable of birth event, 
t n , which takes value one if a woman is observed to give birth in a given year before 
the first of March and zero otherwise, and dummy variables accounting for the personal 
characteristics of sample members: “White” equals one if she is white and zero 
otherwise. “Protestant” is a dummy variable to denote whether a women is Protestant, 
and “Catholic” is a dummy variable for whether she is Catholic. I also include The 
AFQT score which allegedly measures individual’s general mental ability and abilities 
                                                                                                                                                
due to missing AFQT score or education background; 1529 women in the nationally representative 
subsample were rejected because they were 17 years of age or younger; 753 respondents were dropped 
due to missing data.   
17 I run a crude probit model of contraception use based on the information collected in 10 out of 14 years 
to impute the contraceptive usage in 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993. In period t, if the predicted probability 
of contraception usage is larger then .7, I encode it as 1.  
18 Occupational categories are grouped based on the 1977 Standard Occupation Classification System. 
19 The NLSY79 was typically conducted during February and March.   12
leading to potential success. 
20 The original AFQT scores are ranged from 0 to 100. To 
reduce the computational burden, I rescale “AFQT score” to equal one if she earned a 
score between 0 and 25, two if the score is between 26 and 50, three if the score is 
between 51 and 75 and four if the score is between 76 and 100. 
21 
        Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. As mentioned above, 
sample members are chosen conditioned on their finishing schools. Thus the first 
observation year for each woman is defined as the year when she first left school,
 22 
while the last sample year is 1996. Each sample member is observed for 14 years and 
thus there are totally 8708 person-year observations for all sample members across the 
sample span. The table shows that white women account for about 90 percent of these 
622 females with an average age of 20 in the period they first entered the sample. The 
initial average education level is about 12.5 years, which indicates the majority of the 
selected cohort have obtained a high school degree. Averaging over the person-year 
observations, a representative woman is nearly 29 years old, earning a wage of $10.78 
per hour.
23  Of the total 8798 person-year observations, over 57 percent are found 
having children younger than 18 years old, of which more than 42 percent are under 5 
years old, nearly 56 percent are married, about 82 percent are using birth control. In 
terms of occupation, 25.5 percent are specialized in professional occupation, 61.3 
percent in non-professional specialties, and 13.1 percent not working in the labor 
market.  
       Table 2 reports the summarizing statistics for three subsamples concerning marital 
status. 100 out of 622 women in the sample have never been married by the end of 1996, 
which constitutes 1400 persons-year observations. It indicates that an average never 
married woman is a white 28 years old, has some college with about 14.4 years of 
schooling. On average, she has a child ages 5 or younger with a 0.087 probability, 
much smaller than her married counterpart, 0.489. Conditional on marriage, the ever 
divorce sample exhibits a little lower probability of presence of young children at 0.399.  
Compared with 24.7 percent are specialized in professional occupation for married 
sample, only 19.8 percent are professional women in ever divorced group, and in sharp 
contrast with 29.6 percent in the never married cohort. As expected, married cohort use 
birth control at the about 78.2 percent of the time, a little lower than 81.6 percent for 
ever divorced and 91.5 percent for never married women.  
                                                 
20 The AFQT score is the score earned on the Armed Forces Qualification Test in 1981. The test contains 
100 questions equally distributed among the following four areas: vocabulary or verbal concepts; 
arithmetic; spatial relations; and mechanical ability. 
21 The same treatment is taken by Sheran (2007).  
22 In this paper, I do not consider the returning school after some working spell cases.  
23 All wages are reported in 1982 dollars.    13
          Tables 3-6 describe the distribution between occupation, marital status, fertility 
and education. All evidence strongly indicates the significant association between 
career choices and family decisions as well as personal characteristics. Roughly 
speaking, there are slightly more never-married women working as professionals while 
much less are out of labor market. Professional women tend to be childless or to delay 
childbearing relative to other occupational counterparts while few non-working females 
choose to be childless. As far as education and ability are concerned, as expected, 
professional women’s typically have more education and receive higher AFQT scores 
than the other women but no significant difference is documented between non-
professional and non-working. 
 
 
4. Dynamic Programming Optimization 
__________________________ 
         The discrete choice life-cycle maximization problem can be tackled with dynamic 
programming. The major benefit of expressing the infinite (or finite) horizon 
optimization problem by using Bellman equation is that a multi-dimensional problem 
can be reduced to a sequence of two period problems, and solved recursively. An even 
nicer feature of dynamic programming is that it allows for the reward function (period 
utility function) to be stochastic without adding much computational cost. 
          As of the model described above, when incorporating the budget constraint (5) 
and the life-cycle fertility pattern (9) into the utility function (2), the resulting dynamic 
utility maximization problem turns to be  
() {} ()
1
1 ,,, 1 , . . ,
max , , , ,
tt t
T t
tt ttt t pmb t T
p mb w E β
−
= =
⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ Z U                   (12) 
where  t Z is a vector containing all the lagged variables including  1 t p − ,  1 t m − ,  1 t b − , 
1 t D − , and  1 t N − , and the current observable individual characteristics variables  t Z  and 
the welfare payment  t WP .  t w   is the wage earnings vector including the female’s 
occupation-specific wage earnings 
M
t w and 
L
t w , and her husband’s wage earnings 
h
t w . 
The expectation is taken into account the randomness associated with the woman’s 
future choices, fertility pattern, wage earnings, and the choice-specific stochastic utility 
component (,,) tt t p mb ε . 
            As mentioned above, there are totally 12 possibilities or “alternatives” available 
to a woman each period with respect to the choice variables(,,) tt t p mb. Accordingly, I 
have 12 possible choice-specific period utility functions each period which are   14
stochastic due to the choice-specific error term. Let  () k dt  denote the decision variable 
such that  () 1 k dt =   if she chooses alternative k  and  () 0 k dt = otherwise, andkI ∈ . 
Given the woman’s choice, () 1 k dt = ,  I can define the stochastic reward function as 
                () ,     k kt k kt k kt Ru I εω ε =+ = + ∈
'
tt ZZ                            (13) 
where  () i u ⋅   denote the deterministic part of the period utility function given the 
individual chooses alternative k ,  t Z denote the vector of variables including the lagged 
variables, the observable personal characteristics variables for a woman and her 
husband, the ones used in a probit model of life-cycle fertility and the wage earnings 
equations.  k ω   is the vector of coefficients of the corresponding to these variables.  kt ε , 
1,..., tT = are the choice-specific composite random components associated with the 
female’s utility function, wage earnings, and fertility, which are assumed to be 
independently distributed over time and individuals.  
            Denote  the  relevant  information  set  as () St , which contains the current 
realizations of the error terms kt ε , the vector of current and lagged variables,  t Z , and 
the values of  k ω ’s,  the dynamic program can expressed as 
[ ] { } 1 m a x ( () ) ( ( 1 ) )| () 1 ,  () (( ) )
t
tk t t k
kI
R St EV St d t St VS t β +
∈
=+ + =               (14) 
for  1,..., 1 tT = − , kI ∈  




RS T VS T
∈
=                   (15) 
for period T . 
           Starting from the last period value function  T V  in (15) and given a distribution 
assumption for the kt ε ’s, I can solve the model backwards to find all the optimal value 
functions (( ) ) t VS t for 1,..., 1 tT =− . Note that the backwards recursion in solving the 
dynamic programming problem is straightforward though, it still involves the 
evaluation of the conditional expectations   [ ] 1(( 1 ) ) |  ( ) 1 ,   ( ) tk E VS t d t S t + +=  for  each 
choice  k and period t, which is not a trivial task. In addition, the multivariate 
integration necessary to calculate the conditional expectation generally does not have a 
closed form solution. However, according to Dubin and McFadden (1984), the extreme 
value distribution assumption of  kt ε   would allow us to obviates the necessity of 
numerically computing multivariate integrals.  
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5. Estimation 
__________________________ 
         As discussed previously, to make analytically solving the dynamic optimization 
problem feasible and to facilitate our estimation of parameters, I need to restrict the 
composite error terms, kt ε ’s, to follow certain preferable distribution. A popular choice 
is to assume they are independently and identically extreme value distributed with 
density function as:
 24 
{ } { } ()e x pe x p / kt kt F ε εσ =−− , kI ∈             (16) 
where σ  is scale factor such that the variance of  kt ε equals 
22 /6 σπ . 
         The  benefit  of  .. . iid extreme value distribution assumption is that it greatly 
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where  0.577216 γ = is the Euler’s constant, and () k u t+1 Z 11 kt kt R ε + + = − 1 k ω + =
'
t+1 Z  as 
defined above,
 25 and also a close form for the conditional probabilities for the choice of 
alternativek , which is specifically a well-known multinomial logit formula. 
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What remains is to incorporate the restriction from the availability of job choice 
set. As I have discussed before, in some periods a woman prefers working, but she has 
to stay at home due to the poor job marketing. And thus I need to update (16) and (18) 
with respect to the incompletion of the choice availability. According to the law of total 
probability, the probability that alternative k  is chosen in period tcan be expressed as 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Dubin and McFadden (1984), Rust (1987), Berkovec and Stern (1991), and Van Der 
Klaauw (1996). 
25 In general, the multivariate integration necessary to calculate the left hand side term in equation (17) 
can only be solved numerically without a closed form solution.   16
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Provided that parameters and the function forms of () k u t Z and arrival rates of 
job offer opportunities are known, I can easily compute the values of the expectation of 
the value functions, { 12 ( ), ( ),..., ( ) T E VE V E V}, and hence substitute into (20) to obtain 
the restricted conditional choice probabilities, Pr( ( ) 1| ,   ) ks dt J = t Z for  1,..., tT = , 
1,...,4 k = , recursively, and finally to compute the unrestricted conditional choice 
probabilities in (19), Pr( ( ) 1| ) k dt = t Z  for 1,..., tT = .  
Given observed data on an individual’s choices and state variables and the 
solution to the dynamic programming problem, we are now in position to state exactly 
how the structural parameters of model can be estimated. To alleviate computation 
burden of dynamic programming problem, I estimate the earning equation and the birth 
probit model outside of the structure model, and then δ in earning equations (6)-(8) and 
γ  in birth probability function in (9) are treated as given in the following estimation of   17
structure model.
 26 By assumption, all workers are assumed to work full time, therefore 
I multiply hourly wage with 2,000 hours as an individual’s wage earnings.
 27 I use 
Heckman’s two-stage model to correct selection bias caused by using data only on 
female workers (Heckman 1974).The NLSY doesn’t provide much information on 
husband’s characteristics. Therefore, each (potential) husband’s observable 
characteristics are assumed the same as his wife. This approach has been used by Van 
Der Klaauw (1996). The birth probability model is estimated by controlling age, lagged 
birth control, lagged marital status, lagged occupational choices, and own wage as well 
as her (potential) husband’s wage earnings. Estimates of parameters in birth function 
are used to predict the probability of giving birth in the structure model.  
Let θ  denotes the parameters to be estimated, which includes  k ω  in equation 
(13) andπ ’s associated with the arrival rates in (19). The parameters are estimated by 
maximizing the likelihood function for the sample data. Given a panel of T (T =14) 
periods’ time series observations on N=622 individuals, I can construct the sample 
likelihood function based the choice probabilities: 
11 2 1
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The likelihood function taking the simple form of the product of the choice 
probabilities across individuals and time is attributed to the  .. . iid extreme value 
distribution of the composite error terms.  
            The likelihood function in equation (22) is maximized numerically based on 
Newton-Raphson algorithm. The kernel of the iteration equation of the algorithm is 
specified as 
1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () ()
mm m m Hg θθ θ θ
− + ⎡⎤ =+ ⋅ ⎣⎦         (23) 
where  () g ⋅ and () H ⋅ are the gradient vector of the log likelihood function and the 
Hessian matrix of second derivatives of the log likelihood function: 
                                                 
26 Taking into account of the possible selection bias of the women sample due to using data only on 
workers, I use Heckman’s two stage method (1974) in the estimation of women’s wage earning equation. 
Men’s wage earning equation are estimated directly through OLS.   
27 See also Swann(2005) and Van Der Klaauw (1996).   18





























The supscript m denotes the mth iteration. The estimation begins with an initial guess of 
(0) θ . Based on this initial value, the likelihood function and the derivatives 
(0) () g θ and
(0) () H θ are computed. 
(0) () g θ and 
(0) () H θ  are used to update θ  by (23). 
Continue the iteration for  1, 2,... m = until for some 
* m  such that 
** () ( 1 ) mm θθ
− −  is less 
than certain preset tolerance, say
8 10
− .  
        It is important to note, from a methodological point of view, that the choice of 
error structure is crucial for the way that a discrete choice dynamic model is solved and 
estimated. Adopting an error structure independently distributed over time and 
individuals, as many researchers like Rust (1987), Berkovec and Stern (1991), and van 
der Klaauw (1996), implicitly assumes that the observed career choices and family 
decisions of women are captured by the variation in their observable characteristics. 
And this is to assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is irrelevant and that the error 
term is serially uncorrelated. Nevertheless, there is evidence that certain unmeasured 
variables may be important in characterizing the exhibited serial persistence women’s 
labor supply behaviors and marital and fertility patterns other than state dependence, 
and that the error term is also likely to be autocorrelated.  
        It  has  been  well-known  that  the  high degree of serial persistence in female’s 
working behavior in discrete panel datasets can be possibly attributed to state 
dependence, unobserved permanent heterogeneity, and autocorrelation in the error term. 
Heckman and Willis (1977) and Heckman (1981) distinguish these two sources of time 
persistence as “true state dependence” and “spurious state dependence” respectively. 
There is true state dependence if previous participation choices affect current labor 
supply decisions. Interpretations of state dependence include human capital 
accumulation (e.g. Heckman 1981), intertemporally nonseparable preferences for 
leisure (e.g. Hotz, Kydland, and Sedlacek 1988), search costs of finding a new job (e.g. 
Eckstein and Wolpin 1990), and fixed costs of work such as child care needs, 
transportation, relocation of housework, resolution of scheduling conflicts which might 
differ by the previous employment state (e.g. Nakamura and Nakamura 1994, Prowse 
2005).  For example, a woman leaving the labor market to care for a new born may 
suffer from depreciation in the stock of human capital (work experience) during the 
period she is not active in the work force, and thus may be likely to remain out of the   19
labor market the following year. Potential employers may also believe that a female 
who has been unemployed is not as productive as an identical applicant who has not 
experienced these events, which increases the search costs for nonparticipants. 
              In contrast, serial persistence due to spurious state dependence is attributed to 
permanent unobserved heterogeneity in which the unobserved individual component 
determines current participation irrespective of past working status. In terms of the 
association between female labor supply and children, for example, a woman with a 
higher “taste” for children and with lower unobservable abilities and skills on the labor 
market is more likely to be observed to have higher fertility and low labor force 
participation while a female with strong preference for a career will be rarely recorded 
as being inactive in the labor market.  
        Correctly distinguishing between state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity 
is not only theoretically meaningful, but also has important implications for policy 
makers choosing different labor market and social policies. For example, if there is 
substantial permanent unobserved heterogeneity, policies which is aiming to encourage 
non-employed individuals into full-time jobs must have effect on fostering individual’s 
tastes and motivation for work while if there is substantial state dependence, policies 
which can help accumulate human capital or lower barriers to labor market entry (e.g. 
costs of job search, child care needs, etc.) is likely to increase the number of individuals 
who are in full-time employment. On the other hand, a same labor market or social 
policy may have different effects in these two scenarios. In case of spurious state 
dependence, a temporary policy intervention encouraging labor force participation may 
only have a single period effect on employment behavior while if true state dependence 
is present, such a policy intervention will have a lasting effect on employment behavior. 
In this regard, noted by Heckman (1981) that, if heterogeneity is present in the true 
model and one ignores it, estimating a model that only allows for state dependence, on 
will tend to overestimate the degree of state dependence. Equally true, but less often 
noted, is the fact that if state dependence is present in the true model and one ignores it , 
estimating a model with only heterogeneity, then the heterogeneity in the population 
will tend to be exaggerated. In the same line, Carro (2003) point out, permanent 
unobserved heterogeneity may bias estimates and lead to misleading conclusions about 
the effect of a variable if we do not control for it, and “in dynamic model, the state 
dependence coefficients are seriously biased getting significative coefficients even 
when there is no state dependence and persistence is only due to permanent 
heterogeneity”. 
            As a consequence, using models with more general specifications allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence as well as autocorrelation is an 
important issue in econometrics. Several recent studies of female labor supply have   20
followed this approach. Using maximum simulated likelihood (MSL), Hyslop (1999) 
estimates both dynamic panel probit and linear probability models of female labor 
supply that included a rich pattern of unobserved heterogeneity and true state 
dependence, as well as autoregressive errors. Based on U.S. panel data PSID, Hyslop 
finds that participation decisions are characterized by significant state dependence, 
unobserved heterogeneity, and negative serial correlation in the error component. 
Adopting the same model as Hyslop (1999), Islam (2005) and Okamura and Islam 
(2006) examine the effects of state dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, and serially 
correlated transitory error in the participation behavior of married women in Sweden 
and Japan, respectively. Quite different from Hyslop (1999), they find the effect of state 
dependence is negligible, but the serially correlated transitory error has significantly 
positive effect on female’s participation behavior. In the same line, Chib and Jeliazkov 
(2004) apply a semiparametric hierarchical Bayes analysis to the setting of Hyslop 
(1999). They show that their results strengthen Hyslop’s (1999) finding that 
participation is characterized by significant state dependence, and also find support for 
the presence of heterogeneity in the effect of children on the mother’s labor supply.  
       One rather surprising finding by Hyslop (1999) is that when dynamic factors in 
female labor supply are excluded, fertility is not exogenous while in dynamic 
specification with serially correlated errors he finds no evidence against the exogeneity 
of fertility hypothesis. This, apparently, deviates from the conventional wisdom. One 
plausible explanation, or probably one drawback of Hyslop’s approach, is that he 
excludes the possibility of interaction between the participation history and fertility. It 
is generally accepted that the presence of children, and especially young children, 
decreases the labor supply of the mother (e.g. Mroz 1987), and that women plan the 
number and timing of their children according to labor market factors (e.g. Waite and 
Stolzenberg 1976). Hence, it is strongly suggested that fertility decision should be 
examined in a more realistic manner, in which fertility and female labor force 
participation decisions are jointly taken into account (e.g. Moffitt 1984, Hotz and Miller 
1988, Del Boca 2002). In addition, Carrasco (1998) presents a switching model which 
accounts for selectivity bias as well as for other form of time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. His results indicate that assuming the exogeneity of fertility induces a 
downward bias in absolute value in the estimated negative effect of fertility on 
participation. Recently, Keane and Sauer (2006) extend Hyslop’s framework to allow 
classification error in employment status. They find that a fairly small amount of 
classification error is enough to overturn Hyslop’s conclusions, leading to 
overwhelming rejection of the hypothesis of exogenous fertility. One another issue 
regarding Hyslop’s model is noteworthy, that he considers only married women. Since 
the sorting of individuals into marriage is nonrandom and the personal characteristics   21
that affect marriage formation are likely to be related to characteristics that affect labor 
supply behavior. On the other hand, it is well known that marriage and fertility 
decisions are highly interdependent. Conditioning on the completed choice of marriage 
may induce a sample selection bias and, to some extent, imposes predeterminedness on 
fertility.  
              After incorporating unobserved heterogeneity to the framework of the present 
paper, the estimated effects of state dependence, or duration effects, in women’s 
choices for occupation, marriage, fertility, and birth control would be expected to be 
smaller but statistically significant, given the evidence documented by the previous 
studies on U.S. panel data that spurious state dependence due to unobserved 
heterogeneity is significant and robust. The effect of relaxing the assumption that 
choice-specific error terms are independent over time and individual to allow serially 
correlated error terms may be ambiguous. First, the previous studies have found 
disaccording results across different data sets, like Hyslop (1999), Islam (2005), Croda 
and Kyriazidou (2005), and Michaud and Tatsiramos(2005)28. Second, virtually no 
studies have attempted to examine the multivariate error terms associated with 
women’s choices for occupation, marriage, fertility and contraception use. It is 
practically hard to reasonably predict the compound effects from these error terms. 
Third, past empirical evidence on discrete-choice models with random effect has 
indicated misspecification of serial correlation error structure has fairly minor effects 
on the estimates of the coefficients for exogenous variables (e.g. Keane 1997).  
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
__________________________ 
 
6.1 Parameter Estimates 
             The dynamic model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with the 
discount factor 0.9 β = .
29 Table 7 presents parameter estimates and standard errors of 
the female and male wage earnings equations. It shows that education and ability have 
positive effects on wage earnings for both women and men, regardless of which job 
category a woman holds.  
               After controlling the working experience, I find that age has a mixed effect on 
women’s wage earnings in that professional women significantly benefit from aging, 
while their nonprofessional counterparts get slightly lower wage earnings as they get 
                                                 
28  The latter two reject the hypothesis of AR(1) in dynamic labor supply model using German data. 
29 The choice of the discount factor is somewhat a convention along with the literature while different 
values may be tried.    22
older. One possible justification is that professional jobs call for mental maturity and 
technical sophistication, which are developed with age. Although age and thus 
experience are undoubtedly important, most nonprofessional jobs lay relatively more 
weight on youthfulness. Another explanation regarding the negative effect on wage 
earnings for the nonprofessional female could be that they have higher rate of 
depreciation of human capital over time than their professional counterparts since 
leaving school.  
                The effects of last period experience are of most interest. If maintaining the 
previous category of job, the previous period’s job decision and working experience 
have considerably positive effect on the current wage earnings while job switching has 
different effects for different groups of women. A current professional woman may 
suffer from her previous nonprofessional working experience while a current 
nonprofessional female could take advantage of her former professional working 
experience, especially for those who just shifted from the professional positions. All 
working people are affected by their ethnic status and their respective job market 
features. In particular, white men and white professional women earns substantially 
more than their nonwhite counterparts, while nonprofessional female may only slightly 
get higher wage earnings than the nonprofessional nonwhite counterparts. Although 
both consistently affecting workers’ earnings, the average wage level is a more 
important factor than the unemployment rate as of the market features.  
            Table  8  reports  the  estimates  of  the  probit  model  which  accounts  for  the 
probability of a woman giving birth at time t  given the information observed at 
time 1 t − , which includes her age, marital status, whether she uses any contraceptive 
methods, the number of children she has had, last period’s working decision, her 
husband’s wage earnings if married, and her own wage earnings if she is working. The 
predicted probit model shows that birth control has a significantly negative effect on the 
probability of future childbearing, while maintaining wedlock produces an opposite 
effect with a similar magnitude.  
               Age,  as  expected,  is  negatively  associated  with  the  birth  probability  in  a 
modest manner. The result regarding aging, however, is somewhat blurred since 
according to Hotz and Miller (1988), a woman’s birth probability may be peaked 
around the age of 25 and then followed by a rapid fall. This suggests that classifying the 
sample data into different cohorts in terms of women’s age may allow us to examine 
the aging effect in more depth. In addition, a working female may lower the probability 
of her next period’s childbearing, regardless of what kind of job she is taking. However, 
professional women exhibits much lower fertility size than their nonprofessional 
counterparts. As of income, a rise in a woman’s own wage earnings and her spouse’s 
wage earnings will surely increase the pecuniary affordability of additional child for the   23
family. As a result, the probability of next period birth is substantially positively 
correlated with the couple’s wage earnings, in which there are no significantly different 
income effects between professional women and nonprofessional women. Intriguingly, 
the number of children a woman ever born seems to have no significant effect on her 
next birth after controlling all other covariates.  
         Table 9 presents the estimates of the structural parameters. As shown in the table, 
a married woman enjoys higher utility flows when aging, which can be attributed to the 
impact of maturation. In terms of ethnic status, nonwhite women obtain lower utility 
flows from marriage than whites. One of the possible reasons may be nonwhite women 
enjoy relatively lower level of his spouse’s wage earnings since the latter has been 
reported to have significant lower wage earnings level than white men. 
           The presence of children, especially young children, increases the utility gains 
from marriage. This is consistent with Becker’s (1973) approach to marriage that views 
children born within marriage as marriage-specific capital. The divorce cost is $2,522 
in thousands of 1982 dollars, which could be interpreted as the net benefit of getting 
divorced for females this period. Correspondingly, the negative estimates associated 
with marriage, $1,483, is the fixed utility cost of getting married, which could be 
viewed as representing the economic cost she may share for the marriage ceremony.  
          Table 9 also indicates that both professional and nonprofessional women benefit 
significantly from working experience in their respective occupations. Professional 
women enjoyed from longer working experience with a higher magnitude than her 
nonprofessional counterparts. In the meantime, age has different impacts on working 
females. A professional worker derives substantial positive utility flows in age, while 
their nonprofessional counterparts are induced a considerably negative utility flows 
when they are getting older. In this vein, it is consistent with what has been discussed 
above about the effect of age on wage earnings with respect to different category jobs. 
Nonwhite females, as the table shown, enjoy lower utility flows from labor market 
work regardless of the category of jobs, while the white professionals get markedly 
more utility flows than the white nonprofessionals.  
Another interesting finding is that the higher AFQT score increases a female’s 
utility flows in a dramatic magnitude if she works in a professional occupation. On the 
contrary, all else equal, the higher AFQT score makes a nonprofessional female’s utility 
flow decrease, which may be due to her unsatisfactory work fulfillment conditional on 
her higher ability. As expected, estimates of education reveal that education increase a 
working woman’s utility flows, especially for professionals.  
Related to the fertility status, table 9 shows that the presence of children significantly 
decreases the utility gains from labor market work. Not surprisingly, this decrease is 
much greater for children under the age of six for whom caring is more time-intensive   24
compared to children age 6 and older. It is noteworthy that the estimates further 
indicate that on average professional women suffer more than nonprofessionals in the 
presence of children. This could be mainly because those children, especially the very 
young, are negatively related to female labor supply. For example, Lundberg and Rose 
(2000) show that a first child reduces female wages by 5 percent and hours by 45 
percent. In general, the opportunity cost of spending more time at home to take care of 
children for professional women is higher than nonprofessionals. As a result, the 
children (particularly young children) decrease professional women’s utility at a higher 
magnitude than the nonprofessional females.  
Job search cost from other occupations to professionals is about $3,453 on 
average, which is much higher than $1,349 for the mobility from other occupations to 
nonprofessional. This infers that the interruptions of working continuation will blemish 
a professional woman more than a nonprofessional, and is more costly for professional 
woman. Therefore, we could expect and rationalize the fact that the fertility pattern of a 
professional woman is quite different from the other two groups. For example, 
occupational upward mobility is associated with higher probability of being unmarried 
and postponing parenthood.  
          As of birth control, Table 9 shows that a woman enjoys more utility flows from 
using contraceptive methods as they are getting mature. This reflects that contraception 
use increases with age particularly in female fecund period. Relative to nonwhite 
females, white females derives more utility flows. This effect could be attributed to the 
racial disparity in the access to family planning as well as different ethnic culture 
regarding contraception and out-of-wedlock births. Another interesting aspect regarding 
the birth control is the number of children ever born increases the utility flows from 
contraception use. This may reflect that parenting is very time intensive to a woman 
and she benefits from contraception usage to better budget her time when she already 
has at least one child. For the similar reason, relative to the number of older children, a 
woman enjoyed higher utility flow through the usage of contraception with the presence 
of young children, because without any doubt, young children rearing requires more 
time investment. 
 
6.2 Goodness of Fit 
            To measure how well the model describes the data, I compare the women’s 
actual choices with predicted measures of females’ occupation choices, marital status, 
and birth control decisions. The predicted measures are obtained through simulation on 
the basis of the estimated structural parameters described in the preceding section. The 
simulation is fairly straightforward: given a particular random draw of the error tem 
from the extreme value distribution, I simulate relevant choice for every woman over 
her sample life cycle and then the predicted percentage is computed by averaging over   25
the number of sample members. For each choice measure, I repeat 100 random draws 
of the error term and average these 100 outcomes over the number of draws.   
By and large, the dynamic model fit the data very well. Table 10 presents the 
actual and the predicted percentages of women’s choices and other statistics. As we can 
see, the actual professional, nonprofessional, and nonworking females account for 25.5 
percent, 61.3 percent, and 13.2 percent respectively while the model predicts 24.7 
percent, 60.4 percent, and 14.9 percent correspondingly. About 82.3 percent of women 
choose to use birth control over the sample years which the model slightly overpredicts 
this measure by 4percent. Chi-square goodness of fit tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the actual number of total person-year is the same at 5percent 
significance level as those number predicted for both choices.   However, as expected, 
the tests reject the null hypothesis that the predicted and the actual numbers of the total 
person-year are the same for marriage. Specifically, the model overpredicts total 
married person-year observations, through the assumption that marriage offer always is 





This study provides a framework for the analysis of women’s occupation choices, 
marriage, and fertility decisions women take over their life cycle, taking into account 
uncertainty about the future, breaking new ground in two important ways. Given that 
there is an extensive literature in labor economics recognizes that the life-cycle labor 
force participation of a woman is highly associated with her family choices, virtually no 
study going further to incorporate female occupational choices. The model presented in 
this paper incorporate the role of professional occupation in a dynamic setting with 
other life-cycle decisions. Another important contribution to the literature is that job 
offers from different occupations are further modeled to capture uncertainties of the 
dynamics in the labor market. The estimation results of structural parameters indicate 
that the life-cycle patterns of occupation, marriage and contraceptive behaviors varies 
significantly with their observable characteristics such as education, ability, race and 
strongly depends on the presence of children, especially children younger than 6 years 
old. This work finds that professional females experienced a substantial reduction in 
utility as much as three times than that of their nonprofessional counterparts, due to the 
presence of children younger than 5 years old. Job search cost from other occupations 
to professionals is much higher than the mobility from other occupations to 
nonprofessional. This infers that the interruptions of working continuation will blemish 
a professional woman more than a nonprofessional, and is more costly for professional   26
woman. Therefore, we could expect and rationalize the fact that the fertility pattern of a 
professional woman is quite different from the other two groups. For example, 
occupational upward mobility is associated with higher probability of being unmarried 
and postponing parenthood. Higher AFQT score increases a female’s utility flows in 
dramatic magnitude if she works in a professional occupation. On the contrary, all else 
equal, the higher AFQT score makes a nonprofessional female’s utility flow decreases, 
which may be due to her unsatisfactory work fulfillment conditional on her higher 
ability. 
          It  is  important  to  note  that  incorporating  unobserved  heterogeneity  to  the 
framework of the present paper, the estimated effects of state dependence, or duration 
effects, in women’s choices for occupation, marriage, fertility, and birth control would 
be expected to be smaller but statistically significant, given the evidence documented 
by the previous studies on U.S. panel data that spurious state dependence due to 
unobserved heterogeneity is significant and robust. As discussed previously, the effect 
of relaxing the assumption that choice-specific error terms are independent over time 
and individual to allow serially correlated error terms may be ambiguous, and adding 
unobserved heterogeneity would substantially increased the computational cost of 
estimating the model presented in this paper, concerning the huge amount of state 
variables. In this regard, seeking more efficient computational algorithm along with the 
more complicated dynamic discrete choice model allowing for unobserved 
heterogeneity and autocorrelation would be left for the future work.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
     
Variable   Number of 
Observations  Mean Standard  Deviation 
      
sample of 622 individuals  
      
age at 1st period*   622  20.246  1.107 
White 622  0.900  0.300 
AFQT score  622  58.711  26.482 
categorical AFQT  622  2.177  1.045 
Protestant 622  0.215  0.411 
Catholic 622  0.349  0.477 
education at 1st period  622  12.532  2.566 
highest grade attended  622  14.280  2.838 
professional and managerial in 1982 622  0.138  0.345 
non-professional in 1982  622  0.788  0.409 
home production in 1982  622  0.074  0.262 
      
sample of 8708 person-year observations 
      
age 8708  28.817  4.298 
number of children ages 0-5  8708  0.425  0.675 
number of children ages 6-12  8708  0.144  0.436 
number of children ages 13-18  8708  0.006  0.081 
married 8708  0.558  0.497 
professional specialty  8086  0.255  0.436 
non-professional specialty  8086  0.613  0.487 
home production  8086  0.131  0.338 
birth control*  7324 0.823 0.376 
hourly wage*  4609  10.780  7.654 
spouse houly wage  2995  15.896  16.219 
           
* 1. The first observation year for each sample member is defined as the year when she first left school  
   2. wages are in 1982 dollars 
   3. Some of the variables are subject to missing data. The statistics presented above are from original sample    
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
           
Variable   Number of Observations  Mean Standard Deviation 
      
sample of 1400 person-year observations: never married 
      
age 1400  28.761 4.279 
White 1400  0.770  0.421 
highest grade attend   1400  14.390 2.857 
number of children ages 0-5  1400  0.087  0.322 
number of children ages 6-12  1400  0.029  0.187 
number of children ages 13-18  1400  0.001  0.027 
professional specialty  1300  0.296  0.457 
non-professional specialty  1300  0.628  0.483 
home production  1300  0.075  0.264 
birth control  1039  0.915  0.286 
      
sample of 7308 person-year observations: ever married  
      
age 7308  28.817 4.298 
White 7308  0.925  0.263 
highest grade attend   7308  14.259 2.831 
number of children ages 0-5  7308  0.489  0.705 
number of children ages 6-12  7308  0.166  0.465 
number of children ages 13-18  7308  0.007  0.087 
professional specialty  6786  0.247  0.431 
non-professional specialty  6786  0.611  0.488 
home production  6786  0.142  0.349 
birth control  6285  0.782  0.431 
      
sample of 2058 person-year observations: ever divorced  
      
age 2058  28.810 4.304 
White 2058  0.918  0.274 
highest grade attend   2058  13.694 2.466 
number of children ages 0-5  2058  0.399  0.649 
number of children ages 6-12  2058  0.156  0.443 
number of children ages 13-18  2058  0.009  0.093 
professional specialty  1911  0.198  0.399 
non-professional specialty  1911  0.653  0.476 
home production  1911  0.149  0.356 
birth control  1539  0.816  0.371 
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Table 3: Occupation Distribution of Women, by marital status   
    
Occupational category*  Never Married  Ever Married  Ever Divorced   
1. professional  29.62%  24.73%  19.83%   
2. non-professional  62.85%  61.05%  65.25%   
3. nonworking  7.54%  14.22%  14.91%   
Total 100%  100%  100%   
N  100 522 147   
* 1980 census of population: Standard Occupation Classification System 
        
        
        
Table 4: Marital Status of Women, by Occupation   
    
Marital Status  professional  non-professional  nonworking   
never married  18.87%  16.23%  9.76%   
ever married  81.13%  83.51%  90.24%   
proportion of ever divorced 22.48% 30.09% 29.73% 
Total   100%  100%  100%   
N 159  381  82   























   30
Table 5: Occupation and Fertility 
 
   childlessness  number of live births  age at first birth 
   mean  std dev  mean  std dev  mean   std dev 
professional 0.353  0.479  1.157  1.076  28.750  4.435 
            
non-professional 0.308 0.463 1.358 1.129  25.449  4.139
            
non-working 0.082  0.277  2.113  1.172  24.233  3.712 
            
P value of two sample t-test between 
professional vs other  0.0121 0.0001 0.0013 




            
Table 6: Occupation, Education and AFQT Score    
                 
  Years of Schooling  AFQT Score    
   mean  std dev  mean  std dev    
                  
professional 15.907  2.130  68.868  23.826    
           
non-professional 13.433  2.726  53.489  25.765    
           
non-working 13.660  3.051  54.629  28.214    
           
P value of two sample t-test between 
professional vs other  <0.0000 0.0001   
N 622  622   
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Table 7: Estimates of Wage Equation 
Variable   Estimate Std. Error
Women's Wage Equation    
   Professional  
     
 
  Constant  -2.094** 0.478 
  Age  0.105* 0.057 
  White  0.089** 0.023 
  AFQT score  0.054* 0.031 
  Education  0.532** 0.118 
  Protestan  0.005 0.032 
  Catholic  0.010 0.046 
  Unemployment Rate  -0.034 0.102 
  Average wage earnings  0.076** 0.033 
  lagged working decision  1.073** 0.375 
  lagged alternative working decision  -0.159 0.411 
  Experience  0.984* 0.589 
  Alternative expreience  -0.778** 0.237 
  Experience squared  -0.023 0.029 
      
 
  Nonprofessional 
    
  Constant  -3.104** 0.899 
  Age  -0.048 0.053 
  White  0.056 0.077 
  AFQT score  0.107 0.100 
  Education  0.236 0.151 
  Protestan  0.004 0.025 
  Catholic  0.007    0.036 
 
  Unemployment Rate  -0.213 0.169 
  Average wage earnings  0.038** 0.007 
  lagged working decision  1.324** 0.325 
  lagged alternative working decision  0.632** 0.085 
  Experience  0.742** 0.223 
  Alternative expreience  0.233* 0.133 
  Experience squared  -0.076 0.054 
  inverse Mills ratio  3.457 0.734 
Men's Wage Equation 
    
 
  Constant  -0.987* 0.517 
  Age  0.076 0.053 
  White  0.325** 0.078 
  AFQT score  0.442**    0.126 
 
  Education  0.653** 0.111 
  Protestan  0.003 0.008 
  Catholic  0.011 0.032 
  Unemployment Rate  -0.052 0.044 
  Average wage earnings  0.087* 0.045 
  Experience  0.274** 0.099 
  Experience squared  0.113** -0.959 
             
Note: * represents significance at 0.10; ** at 0.05 * ** at 0.01  Wage earnings are normalized in terms of 1982 wage level 
* Women's wage equation is estimated through Heckman two stage selection model due to the selection bias by only using data on  
   workers. Parameters controlled in the selction equaion include the marital status and presense of young and old children.    
2
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                      Variable     Estimaties  Std. Error 
 
 
       
  Constant   -1.472*  0.779 
 
 
  Age -0.031  0.023 
  Age squared    -0.044  0.038 
 
 
  Lagged birth control    -0.857** 0.097 
  Lagged marital status  0.773**  0.126 
  Lagged number of children ever born  -0.094  0.073 
 
 
  Lagged working status     
           Profssional  -0.251*  0.129 
          Nonprofessional  -0.143  0.131 
 
 
  Husband's wage if married  0.064**  0.013 
  Female's wage if working     
           Profssional  0.052**  0.017 
           Nonprofessional  0.049**  0.019 
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Table 9: Parameter Estimates of Structure Model  
Variable   Etsimate  Std.  Error 
Married 
      
 Constant     -2.612**    0.636 
 Age     0.054*    0.032 
 White     0.682**     0.034   
 AFQT  score     -0.017*    0.010 
 Education    0.043 0.038 
 Protestan     0.018     0.031   
 Catholic     -0.002     0.034   
 Child  age  <6     1.064**     0.082   
 Child  age  6-18     0.072     0.048   
 Divorce  cost     2.522**    0.884 
 Marriage      -1.483** 0.445 
 Marriage  duration     -0.222**    0.084 
Working      
 
  Professional       
  Constant     -2.786**    0.583 
  Age     0.051*   0.031 
  White     0.185**     0.033   
  AFQT score     0.276**     0.079   
  Education    0.063**  0.998 
  Protestan     0.199**     0.067   
  Catholic     0.143**     0.073   
  Child age <6     -3.774**    0.021 
  Child age 6-18     -0.271**    0.101 
 
  Job search cost    -3.453**  0.862 
  Working experience     0.779**    0.186 
 
  Nonprofessional      
  Constant    -1.071  0.663 
  Age     -0.321**     0.116   
  White    0.154*  0.089 
  AFQT score     -0.417**     0.010   
  Education    0.041*  0.023 
  Protestan     0.039     0.085   
  Catholic     -0.027     0.088   
  Child age <6     -1.481**    0.082 
  Child age 6-18     -0.383**    0.069 
  Job search cost    -1.349*  0.743 
  Working experience     0.706**     0.048   
Contracepted      
 
  Constant     -1.232**    0.324 
 Age    0.057**    0.021 
 White    0.221**     0.058   
 AFQT  score    0.106* 0.061 
 Education    0.027 0.018 
 Protestan    0.038 0.033 
 Catholic    -0.024 0.019 
 Child  age  <6    0.671**    0.167 
   Child age 6-18    0.543**    0.210 
Note: * represents significance at 0.10; ** represents significance at 0.05.                                         
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Table 10: Actual and Predicted Choices of Selected Measures 
  
Percent of Total Person-Year Observations  Actual   Predicted 
    
working in professional occupation  25.51%  24.67% 
working in non-professional occupation  61.34%  60.38% 
home production  13.15%  14.95% 
    
Married 55.80%  61.19% 
birth control  82.32%  86.32% 
    
Percent of Women Divorced 8.12% 8.72% 
Percent of Women Never Married   33.67%  31.67% 
Percent of Women having presence of children ages 0-6   32.83%  31.43% 
Average Highest Grade Attended   14.28  13.26 
Average Number of Birth per Women   0.61  0.65 
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